1. "Because published opinions construing
the statute do not exist, and the unpublished opinions that do are easily
obtained by interested lawyers and judges, the unpublished opinions may
influence the strategy of counsel and the decisions of trial and perhaps even
appellate courts. The existence for a long period of time of an underground
body of law on the meaning of [Cal. Health & Safety Code] section 11362.795
(to which some members of this panel have admittedly contributed) is
injudicious."
[Dissenting
Opinion of Presiding Justice J. Anthony Kline. People v. Moret,
180 Cal.App.4th 839, 884, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 39 (Cal.App. 1 Dist., 2009.)]
2. "A public trial requires witnesses'
testimony to be public, so it deters perjury. It requires a judge's rulings to
be made in public, as today, so it deters partiality and bias. And by requiring
prosecutors to present their charges and evidence publicly, it deters
vindictiveness and abuse of power."
[Judge
T.S. Ellis, III, regarding a government proposal to restrict
public access to evidence in the forthcoming trial of two former officials of
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee who are charged under the
Espionage Act with unauthorized receipt and transmission of classified
information. Read more about this here.]
3. "[T]here is no more effective practical
guarantee against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that
the principles of law which officials would impose on a minority must be
imposed generally."
Railway Express Agency v. New York (1949),
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Madsen v. Woman’s
Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 763, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed. 593 (1994)
4. “Further, it is no defense to urge that the
religious practices here may be relatively minor encroachments on the First
Amendment. The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all
too soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of Madison, ‘it is proper to
take alarm at the first experiment with our liberties.’"
[Mr. Justice Clark, School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83,
S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed. 844 (1963)]
5. “…although efficacious administration of
governmental programs is not without some importance, "the constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency."
[Mr.
Justice Brennan, Frontiero v. Richardson 411
US. 677, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L. Ed 2d 583 (1973).]
.
6. “Both equal justice and due process emphasize
the central aim of our entire judicial system—all people charged with crime
must, so far as the law is concerned, "stand on an equality before the bar
of justice in every American court."
Mr. Justice Hugo Black, Griffin v. Illinois, 51 U.S. 12, 76
S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed 891 (1956)
7. [re: the incorrect claim California AB 1655
violates the separation of powers doctrine].
“The
word ‘person’ in the contest of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
cannot, by any reasonable mode of interpretation, be expanded to encompass the
States of the Union, and to our knowledge this has never been done by any
court. Likewise, courts have consistently regarded the Bill of Attainder Clause
of the Article I and the principle of separation of powers only as protections
for individual persons and private groups, those who are particularly
vulnerable to non judicial determinations of guilt.
Chief
Justice Warren, South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed. 2d 769 (1966)
8. “To
the extent that his order prohibited the reporting of evidence adduced at the
opening of the preliminary hearing, it plainly violated settled principles:
"[T]here is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that
transpire in the courtroom."
Sheppard v. Maxwell
[384
9. [O]nce a public hearing had been held,
what transpired there
could not be subject to prior restraint.
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427
683 (1976)
10. [re:
incorrect claim that legislatures cannot change court rules (including
separation of powers)]
“The Legislature, however, has taken no action to alter this judicially created
rule, and has declined our more recent suggestion in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal. 3rd 441, 472, fn 19, 194 Cal. Rptr.
390, 668 P 2d 697, that it reconsider the rules on first and second degree
felony murder and misdemeanor manslaughter.”
Ms.
Justice Joyce Kennard, People v.
Patterson, 49 Cal 3rd 615, 262
11. “A statute that ‘effectively suppresses a
large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and
to address to one another . . . is unacceptable if less restrictive
alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose
that the statute was enacted to serve’ [citation omitted]. When plaintiffs
challenge a content-based speech restriction, the burden is on the
Government to prove that the proposed alternatives will not be as effective
as the challenged statute [citation omitted]. In considering this question, a
court assumes that certain protected speech may be regulated, and then asks
what is the least restrictive alternative that can be used to achieve that
goal. The purpose of the test is not to consider whether the challenged
restriction has some effect in achieving Congress’ goal, regardless of the
restriction it imposes. The purpose of the test is to ensure that speech is
restricted no further than necessary to achieve the goal, for it is important
to assure that legitimate speech is not chilled or punished. For that reason,
the test does not begin with the status quo of existing regulations, then ask
whether the challenged restriction has some additional ability to achieve
Congress’ legitimate interest. Any restriction on speech could be justified
under that analysis. Instead, the court should ask whether the challenged
regulation is the least restrictive means among available, effective
alternatives.”
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, (2004) (Kennedy, J., writing
for the majority) (emphasis added).
12. "Undoubtedly [the requirement of a
written opinion] will insure a careful examination of the cases, and result in
well considered opinions, because they must come before the jurists of the
country and be subjected to the severest criticism... . It tends to purity and
honesty in the administration of justice."
Delegate Wilson during
the 1878-1879 California Constitutional Convention. 2 Willis & Stockton, Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of the State of California (1880) at p. 951, col. 1 (quoted in
Chief Justice Lucas' dissent in Powers
v. City of Richmond, 10 Cal. 4th 85, 142 (1995)).
13. “Frankly, I have had more than enough of
judicial opinions that bear no relationship whatsoever to the cases that have
been filed and argued before the judges. I am talking about judicial
opinions that falsify the facts of the cases that have been argued, judicial
opinions that make disingenuous use or omission of material authorities,
judicial opinions that cover up these things with no-publication and
no-citation rules.”
Monroe H. Freedman
- Professor of Law at
14. "There isn't any good argument. It's my
opinion that judges who believe that unpublished opinions should be without
precedential value are driven to that conclusion by the sheer volume of work. I
don't know how the battle will be resolved, but ultimately I hope and believe
that the idea of non-precedential opinions of any kind will be consigned to the
dust bin."
Senior Circuit
Judge Richard S. Arnold of the
15. "I ask you to uphold the values of
America, and remember why so many have come here. We are in a fight for our
principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them."
George W. Bush,
Address to Congress, September 20, 2001
16. Although judiciaries often maintained and
expanded the 'non-publication' rules by refusing to hear challenges to their
propriety, Judge Richard S.
Arnold, together with Judges Heaney and Magnuson, United States Court of
Appeals, Eighth Circuit, found them unconstitutional in Anastasoff v. United States of America, 223 F 3d 896, 235 F 3d 1054 (2000).
17. "At bottom, rules like our Rule 28A(i)
assert that courts have the following power: to choose for themselves, from
among all the cases they decide, those that they will follow in the future, and
those they need not. Indeed, some forms of the non-publication rule even forbid
citation. These courts are saying to the bar: 'We may have decided this
question the opposite way yesterday, but that does not bind us today, and
what's more, you cannot even tell us what we did yesterday.' As we have tried
to explain in this opinion, such a statement exceeds judicial power, which is
based on reason, not fiat."
Judge Richard S. Arnold, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit, in Anastasoff v. United States of America, 223 F 3d 896, 235 F 3d 1054 (2000).
18. "The case is not alone considered as
decided and settled; but the principles of the decision are held, as precedents
and authority, to bind future cases of the same nature. This is the constant
practice under our whole system of jurisprudence. Our ancestors brought it with
them, when they first emigrated to this country; and it is, and always has been
considered, as the great security of our rights, our liberties, and our
property. It is on this account, that our law is justly deemed certain, and
founded in permanent principles, and not dependent upon the caprice or will of
judges. A more alarming doctrine could not be promulgated by any American
court, than that it was at liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions,
and to decide for itself, without reference to the settled course of antecedent
principles."
"This known
course of proceeding, this settled habit of thinking, this conclusive effect of
judicial adjudications, was in the full view of the framers of the
constitution. It was required, and enforced in every state in the Union; and a
departure from it would have been justly deemed an approach to tyranny and
arbitrary power, to the exercise of mere discretion, and to the abandonment of
all the just checks upon judicial authority."
Judge Richard S. Arnold, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit, in Anastasoff v. United States of America, 223 F 3d 896, 235 F 3d 1054 (2000).
More
Quotations
19. "The availability of unpublished
opinions, on computer databases or otherwise, varies from case to case and from
circuit to circuit. The lack of uniform availability of decisions poses serious
problems for litigants in all circuits by creating confusion about what the law
is and where it can be found. Several circuits do post their opinions on the
Internet or a comparably accessible database. We recommend that all circuits do
so. Moreover, we support development of a publicly available database, with an
appropriate media-neutral citation system, for long-term access to all federal
judicial decisions."
Submission of the
United States Department of Justice to the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals
20. "The
California Supreme Court has caused a major flaw undermining our legal system.
I want it fixed now. Appellate court rulings are no longer published for all to
see. Secret rulings do not serve as future guidelines, even in the same court.
They enable judges to ignore the law, knowing this injustice is hidden.
Corruption and arrogance fester at every level because precedent is destroyed.
Feedback to the public, necessary to prevent abuses, is prevented. I will
ensure that this and other justice flaws are fixed, not
buried. The foundation of law and order is order under law."
Michael
K. Schmier, Democratic candidate for California
Attorney General, submitted this candidate statement criticizing the California
Supreme Court for the Official
(http://repository.uchastings.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2165&[CA_ballot_props/1166],
pg. 53, cf. pg. 50; Schmier v. Jones,
California Supreme Court #S068494, List 47, Box 86, 03-09-98; Sacramento
Superior Court #98CS00598, Judge Ronald B. Robie).
21. "The advent of virtually costless on-line
publishing with no need for books or shelves makes nonpublication more
questionable than ever. In general, it’s the dark side of the judicial process
that ought to be brought into daylight."
Stephen F. Barnett, Professor,
22. "Chief Justice Ronald M. George, like
many other appellate judges, defends nonpublication as a "necessary evil
to chill the development of the law."
23. “In an interview last week, George said it
would be "folly" to abandon the nonpublication rule and force the
legal system to reconcile cases that are essentially insignificant.
24. "You’d have a difficult time separating
the wheat from the chaff if you published everything," the Chief Justice
said."
Nos. 22-24, San Francisco Daily Journal, March 9, 1998 Publish is his Platform by Peter Blumberg
25. “Whether published or not, a decision by a
court is a statement of the rule of law and holding by that court and, absent a
rule to the contrary, "a court can properly notice a doctrine or rule of
law from such prior case and apply that principle under the theory of stare
decisis M/V Am. Queen, 708 F.2d at
1941…. The Attorney General's reliance on Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 is misplaced.
That rule, a local rule of the Ninth Circuit, does not govern the citation of
cases decided by district courts. The circuit has previously emphasized that
the circuit rule "prohibits citation to or by this [circuit] court of
unreported decisions of this [circuit] court" Committee of Central Am.
Refugees, 795 F.2d at 1438 n.5 (emphasis in original). ‘Neither the Ninth
Circuit Rules nor the local rules of [this district court] prohibit the
citation of unreported district court opinions.’ The Attorney General's
objection to Clair's citation to unpublished district court decisions is
OVERRULED.”
Judge Gary Taylor, United States District Judge, Central District
Federal Court from a Federal Court order in a capital case.
26. Section 16 - Mr. Busterud had suggested at
the May Commission meeting that the Committee consider making only published
opinions available for citation as precedent. MC- Kleps - reject suggestion
prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions as precedent. Mr. Kleps noted that
the Judicial Council could do this by rule. Mr. Selvin stated that
Minutes of the Meeting of the [
27. "Mr. Schmier claims that in
Human Rights Commission Response to (Marin) Independent Journal (“IJ”)
Editorial by Mayme Hubert and Carole Hayashino, Chair and
28. [The California First District Court of
Appeal ruled the state’s Ellis Act protected a landlord from the
"The hotel
ordinance is not endangered by this decision," (deputy City Attorney)
Schwartz said. "It’s not precedent; it doesn’t bind anybody"
S.F. Landlord
Wins Court Fight Over Replacing Units San Francisco Chronicle 1/28/99 by Jason B. Johnson.
29. “The obstacle to citation is Rule 977 of the
California Rules of Court, the so-called non-citation rule. (Footnote
illegible). It is our view, for reasons to be elaborated that the rule is
invalid for at least two reasons: (1) It violates basic concepts of the
doctrine of stare decisis, (2) It is contrary to the superior command of
Civil Code Section 22.2. The rule is likewise constitutionally suspect, since
it can be argued that in criminal cases, at least, it deprives a defendant the
right to cite a case otherwise favorably controlling his fate. (illegible)
…equal protection of the laws."
(Final pages of decision identifying authors is missing).
People v. Valenzuela filed April 26, 1978
30. "We think it is dangerous to a
democratic society to have more than 93% of all criminal cases considered by
the appellate courts stamped for non-publication"
Rose Bird, later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of California, State
Bar of
31. "[A] fair reading of rule 977 of the
California Rules of Court surely allows citation to the unpublished opinion. To
hold otherwise leaves us in the Orwellian situation where the Court of Appeal
opinion binds us, under Auto Equity Sales
v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 450, 20 Cal.Rptr.321, 369 P.2d 937, but we
cannot tell anyone about it. Such a rule of law is intolerable in a society
whose government decisions are supposed to be free and open and whose legal
system is founded on principles of the common law (Civ. Code, § 22.2) with its
elementary reliance on the doctrine of stare
decisis."
Presiding Judge Cole’ concurrence, County of Los Angeles v. Wilshire
Insurance Co., 103 Cal. App. 3d Supp.1, 3, 163
32. "I would no more say that what [Justice David
Souter] calls "selective prospectivity" is impermissible because it
produces inequitable results than I would say that the coercion of confessions
is impermissible for that reason. I believe that the one, like the other, is
impermissible simply because it is not allowed by the Constitution. Deciding
between a constitutional course and an unconstitutional one does not pose a
question of choice of law."
Justice Antonin Scalia
with whom Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice Harry Blackmun join, concurring
in the judgment in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia 501 U.S. 529, 548
111 S.Ct. 2439, 2450 (1991)
33. “We would have chaos and not the rule of law
if each judge in the land did simply what he or she thought was right instead
of what the law requires.”
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg,
on the children's broadcast Nick News: Nick News (Channel 36, San
Francisco Area, television rebroadcast, Dec. 27, 1997).
34. "Nevertheless, in the interests of
improving the administration of justice, the quality of legal practice, the
orderly growth and development of this state’s decisional law, and the
operation of the selective publication system itself, the committee believes
that providing convenient and inexpensive access to the body of unpublished
decisions is highly desirable."
Report of the
Chief Justice’s Advisory Committee for an Effective Publication Rule .June 1,
1979, pg 15
35. “If an
inexpensive, convenient access system proves feasible, the policy of
non-citation should be reconsidered.”
Report of the Chief Justice’s Advisory Committee for an Effective
Publication Rule .June 1, 1979, pg 18
36. "If I cannot
give a reason I should be willing to stand to [publish as precedent], I must
shrink from the very result which otherwise seems good."
U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens,
37. "Our
government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example."
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis
38. "If the
government becomes a law breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites
everyman to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis
39. "An
imperfectly reasoned and generally result-oriented opinion may be buried in a
non-publication grave. A panel may avoid public heat or appointing authority
disapprobation by interring an opinion of real precedential value. More
frequently, a panel may make a mistake, and fail to publish an opinion."
California Associate Justice Robert S. Thompson, California State Bar
Journal, Nov./Dec. 1975
40. A]ll rulings of
[the] court are precedents, like it or not, and [the court] cannot consign any
of them to oblivion by merely banning their citation…No matter how
insignificant a prior ruling might appear to us, any litigant who can point to
[it] and demonstrate that he is entitled to prevail under it should do so as a
matter of essential justice and fundamental fairness."
41. "Here I am
going nuts because of this opinion that 10 years ago no one would've known
about, and that can't even be cited in the jurisdiction it came from. With
unlimited resources to pay for electronic searches, the entire insurance
industry knows about this opinion and is using it as authority in settlement
negotiations"
As quoted by Richard C. Reuben, "New Cites For Sore Eyes,"
42. "[Those who
choose what opinions to publish] may consciously decide to suppress an opinion
they know to be significant enough to publish either to escape review by a
higher court, to escape criticism for a controversial decision, or even to
allow a court to get away with making a decision contrary to prevailing
law"
Robert S. Gerstein, "Law by Elimination: Depublication in the
43. "[A] rule
which authorizes any court to censor the future citation of its own opinions or
orders rests on a false premise. Such a rule assumes that author is a reliable
judge of the quality and importance of his own work product. If I need
authority to demonstrate the invalidity of that assumption, I refer you to a
citizen of
U.S. Justice John Paul Stevens,
44. "Gaius
Caligula passed many new laws that were never published. When the people
complained, he ordered it posted up, but in a very narrow place and excessively
small letters, to prevent the making of a copy.' Suetonius, the Lives of the
Twelve Caesars 192 (J. Gavorse ed. 1931)"
J. Myron Jacobstein, "Some Reflections of the Control of the
Publication of
Appellate Court Opinions," 27 Stanford L. Rev. 791 (Feb. 1975)
45. "The goal of
a public judiciary, free from the specter of secret adversarial lobbying, is critically
dependent upon the relationship between rules of publication and the doctrine
of Stare Decisis. To the extent that precedential opinions may be deleted by
the Supreme Court without explanation or opinion, that doctrine is undermined
and the orderly development of the law is thwarted."
Julie Hayward Biggs, "Censoring the Law in California:
Decertification Revisited," 30 Hastings Law Journal 1577 (May 1979)
46. "Requiring
all decisions to be supported by a written opinion and to be published would best
advance the error correction goal... publication of a written opinion appears
to be the only practical way of insuring uniform declaration of a law...
publication of written opinions reinforces the public's respect for and
understanding of the judiciary."
J. Clark Kelso, "A Report on the California Appellate
System," 45 Hastings Law Journal 433 (March 1994)
47. "Abolition of
the no-citation rule could help eliminate the idea that non-publication is a
rug under which the judges sweep whatever they wish never to see the light of
day."
Edwin R. Render, "On Unpublished Opinions," 73 Kentucky Law Journal
164 (1984-85)
48. "Finally, the
courts have abandoned the notion of one appellate method for all cases and all
litigants. The significant cases, those brought by wealthy, powerful, or
institutional litigants -- receive the traditional approach model. The routine,
trivial cases -- usually the ones brought by poorer, weaker litigants -- are
relegated to two-track appellate justice. For these cases (about half the
total) the circuit courts have become certiorari courts, rather than courts of
mandatory, appellate jurisdiction that Congress intended."
William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds, "Elitism, Expediency,
and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition," 81
Cornell Law Review 273
49. "We have been
forced to adopt... shortcuts to cope with the rising volume: we hear fewer oral
arguments, publish fewer opinions and rely more heavily on law clerks and staff
attorneys. The heavy volume of cases threatens the ability... to give each case
the attention and care it deserves."
J. Clifford Wallace, "Developing the Mission of the Federal Courts
-- A Method to Determine the Size of the Federal Judiciary," 27
Connecticut Law Review 851, 858 (1995)
50. "Tying up the
question of dissenting with publication may work adversely on the dissenter,
constraining him not to dissent...
Federal Circuit Judge Philip Nichols, Jr., Introduction,
"Selective Publication of Opinions: One Judge's View," 35 American
University L. Rev. 909, 920 (1986)
51. “With
non-publication "stare decisis is twice diminished. First, the decision
itself is freed from their responsibility to reason within the full view.
Second, an increment of precedent is rendered unusable."
Thomas D. Baker, "Rationing Justice on Appeal: The Problems of the
U.S. Courts of Appeal," 130 (1994)
52. "Barring
citation does not prevent the use of unpublished opinions; it merely alters the
character of that use."
Kurt Shuldberg, "Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished
Opinions
in the Federal Courts of Appeals," 85 California Law Review 541
53. "I submit
that stare decisis cannot operate as a `workable doctrine' as long as courts,
while adjudicating sets of identical facts, are able to reach directly contrary
results on diametrically opposed legal theories, by the simple expedient of
publishing one set of results but not the other."
Gideon Kanner, "The Unpublished Appellate Opinion: Friend Or
Foe?"
48 California State Bar Journal 387 (1973)
54. "Certainly,
the objectives of the law courts cannot be merely to resolve as many cases as
quickly as possible. To do that we need only toss two-sided coins, although
two-headed coins might even more efficient."
Prof. Philip B. Kurland, quoted in Rosen and Rosen, "Evolution or
Revolution in the Courts?" 78 Case & Comment 20, 26 (March-April 1973)
.
55. "Unlike the
executive branch of the national government with its arguable (if occasionally
abused) national security concerns, or matters of police intelligence, the
courts have nothing to hide."
Gideon Kanner,"The Unpublished Appellate Opinion: Friend or
Foe?" 48 California State Bar Journal
387 (1973) [Italics in original]
56. "Justice must
not only be done, it must appear to be done. The authority of the federal
judiciary rests upon the trust of the public and the bar. Courts that
articulate no reasons for their decisions undermine that trust by creating the
appearance of arbitrariness."
William L. Reynolds and William M. Richman, "An Evaluation of
Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of
Reform," 48 The University of Chicago Law Review, 573 (1981)
57. "In our
law... the exercise of a power to speak authoritatively as an interpreter
carries with that an obligation to explain the grounds upon which the
interpreter gives the authoritative judgment."
Jerry L. Mashaw, "Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation
of Federal Statutes," 32 William and Merry Law Review 827, 838 (1991)
58. "By signing
his name to a judgment or opinion the judge assures the parties that he has
thoroughly participated in that process and assumes individual responsibility
for the decision."
Owen M. Fiss, "The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary," 92
Yale Law Journal 1442, 1484 (1983)
59. "When
circulated to me, the majority opinion approved by the two justices making up
the majority was marked for Publication in the Official Reports. It was only
after I had circulated my dissenting opinion to the two justices who make up
the majority that they decided to reverse their original position regarding
publication in the Official Reports. I do not think this reversal of position
is justified."
Justice Bernard Jefferson, dissent, in People vs. Para, No. CRA
15889 (California Court of Appeal, Aug. 1979).
60. "In a
government, which is emphatically styled a government of laws, the least
possible range ought to be left to the discretion of the judge. Whatever tends
to render the laws certain, equally tends to limit that discretion; and
perhaps, nothing induces more to that object than the publication of reports.
Every case decided is a check upon the judge: he cannot decide a similar case
differently, without strong reasons, which, for his own justification, he will
wish to make public. The avenues of corruption are thus obstructed, and the
sources of litigation closed."
William Cranch, 1
United States Reports (5 U.S.) iii (1803)
61. "The
`precedential importance' of an opinion... cannot be predetermined by its
author. The Rather, the attorney wishing to rely on the opinion in a subsequent
matter is in a better position to decide whether the opinion is worth
citing."
Edwin
R. Render, "On Unpublished Opinions,"73 Kentucky Law Journal 153
(1984-85)
62. "Any decision
is by definition a precedent and...we cannot deny litigants and the bar the
right to urge upon us what we have previously done."
Fourth Circuit, Jones vs. Superintendent, Virginia State Farm, 465
F.2d 1091, 1094 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 410 U.S. 944 (1973)
63. "Stare
decisis provides some moorings so that men may trade and arrange their affairs
with confidence. Stare decisis serves to take the capricious element out of law
and to give stability to a society."
U.S. Justice William O. Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 49 Columbia
Law Review 736
64. "The labor of
judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if…one could not lay
one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by
others who had gone before him."
Benjamin N. Cardozo, "The Nature of the Judicial Process" 149
(1921)
65. "Judicial
precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a
whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants…"
U.S. Justice John Paul Stevens, Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha
vs. U.S. Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 431